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Towards a Philosophy of Religion with 
the Concept of Pre-established 
Harmony as Guide
KitarO Nishida
translator’s introduction
The modem Japanese philosopher Nishida Ki taro (1870-1945), whose com­
plete works are now collected in 19 volumes (Iwanami Shoten, rev. ed. 
1965), developed his philosophical position during a career which extended 
over a period of more than 30 years from his maiden work, A Study of Good 
(1911), through The Logic of Place and a Religious W'orld-F'iew (1945). During 
this long and active literary career Nishida’s constant rendering of certain 
central insights concerning the immediacy of experience, or what he origi­
nally called “the condition of pure experience,” led him through various 
stages of articulation of his thought culminating in his central notion of basbo, 
the topw of absolute Nothingness understood as the “place” of the immediacy 
of experience, i.e. the “place” of the “eternal present” and the “true self” as the 
self-identity of absolute contradictions and the negation of all negations. Nishida 
first explicitly developed this notion of the topos of absolute Nothingness in 
his key transitional work, Prom the Acting to the Seeing (1927), which then be­
came the basis of his later ideas of the “social-historical world” as “dialectical 
universal.” Questions of epistemology, philosophical anthropology, philosophy 
of science and mathematics, philosophy of aesthetic poiesis, of culture, nation, 
and religion filled out the latter half of Nishida’s career when he came to be 
acclaimed as the foremost philosopher of modem Japan.1
1 Nishida’s Complete Works are available in the Nitbida Kitaro Zembu, 2nd ed., Iwanami 
Shoten, 1965. The following essay is translated from volume XI, pp. 114-46. For transla­
tions in English: Nitbida Ki taro: Intelligibility and the Pbilotopby of Norbingnen, translated with 
an introduction by Robert Schinzinger, Tokyo, 1958; “The Problem of Japanese Culture,” 
translated by Masao Abe in Sourest of Japanese Tradition, ed. by Tsunoda, de Bary, and Keene, 
New York, 1958, pp. 858-72; Nitbida Kitaro: A Study of Good, translated by V. H. Viglielmo,*
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Nishida wrote “Towards a Philosophy of Religion With the Concept of 
Pre-established Harmony as Guide” in 1944, about a year before his death. It 
therefore represents a very late condensation of some of his main ideas which 
came to be known as Nishida tetsugaku (Nishida Philosophy) after 1927. The essay 
has the added value of being his first sustained and explicit treatment of the 
question of a philosophy of religion and of the religious consciousness; it must 
be understood, in fact, as the intermediary link between his general position 
articulated in reference to a broad range of philosophical questions and his 
career-concluding work, The Logic of Place and a Religious ft'orld-Piew (1945), 
completed just two months before his death.
The ideas of “Towards a Philosophy of Religion” were subsumed within the 
more extensive structure of The Logic of Place and a Religious War Id-View, as 
noted above, and therefore prepared the ground for that latter work. But from 
another perspective the former essay stands on its own as a unique probing 
of the metaphysical aspects of the question of the religious consciousness, as 
Nishida understood it. The Western reader may particularly take note of Ni­
shida’s attempted reformulation of the thought ofLeibniz, Cusanus, and Spinoza 
from the point of view of his own “logic of basbo” This metaphysical disquisition 
demonstrates Nishida’s approach to a style of philosophy that has few serious 
rivals in modem times, namely an East-West philosophy based on a sophisti­
cated mastery of key Western philosophers coupled with a penetrating return 
to Eastern tradition.
The whole of the essay is suffused with overtones of Buddhist metaphysical 
ideas. Its opening page takes its point of departure from the concept of “action” 
—of karma and ofewgi or “dependent origination—and then proceeds to develop 
a kind of Middle Path logic of “the self-identity of contradictions.” The reader 
will note again and again that the “place” (basin) of absolute immediacy and 
self-identity is always to be found in the direction of the middle path between 
logical and experiential contradictions—indeed, that the “place” of the con­
crete and eternal present is the very Nothingness or Voidness (liinyata) of the 
Madhyamika. In another respect the whole essay is suffused with a fundamental 
Zen orientation which can be traced in Nishida’s biography to some extent.
Tokyo, i960; Nishida Kit ar 0: Fundamental Problems of Philosophy, translated by David Dil­
worth, Tokyo, 1970.
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Nishida’s use of the Hua-yen (Kegon) concept of “the unhindered mutual 
interpenetration of phenomena” (jiji muge) may also be discovered in his re­
formulation of Leibniz which constitutes the first half of the essay, even though 
this Buddhist concept is not explicitly cited.
Since many authors of East and West have noted the resemblance in thought 
structure between Leibniz and Kegon philosophy, Nishida’s direct con­
frontation of the issues at stake from the point of view of his own philosophy 
may be judged of special value. We can further note that Nishida also takes up 
the question of the mystical via negativa of Cusanus which has often been com­
pared with Buddhist thought. In his dialogue with Leibniz and Cusanus 
Nishida tells us that fundamental differences do indeed exist, and his own use 
of the Prajna pdramitd-sutra, of the Lin-cbi Lu, and of the Japanese Zen masters 
Dogen and Dai to Kokushi is persuasive of this crucial point. It was precisely 
this fundamental insight supported by the aforementioned sources of Buddhist 
tradition which became the nucleus of his articulation of the essence of the 
“religious consciousness” in The Logic of Place and a Religious World-new.
The translator would like to thank the staff of the Eastern Buddhist magazine 
for their help in preparing this translation, and particularly Professor Masao 
Abe for his careful correction of the original draft.
NISHIDA kitarO:
Towards A Philosophy of Religion with the Concept 
of Pre-Established Harmony as Guide
I
I have been developing a position which considers the active world as a 
relational world of opposing individuals. Even the concept of a ‘thing’ must 
take its point of departure from this world of action. For thinking is already a 
form of acting.
However, it is sometimes argued that it cannot be held that individuals are 
relational and mutually opposed entities. But this is because they take their 
departure from an abstract concept of the individual. My position is that con­
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versely the individual should be conceived from an understanding of the mean­
ing of action. Action involves one individual in relation to another. If not, there 
is merely the development of one thing. In his Discourse de metapbysique VIII, 
Leibniz has already said that since activity and passivity originally belong to 
individual substances Qsctiones sunt suppositorum^ the nature of the individual 
must be clarified. The Aristotelian definition of ‘subject that cannot become 
predicate’ is not sufficient. For it can be said that the individual, as subject, 
must contain all predicates which can be spoken of it. Thus Leibniz holds that 
all predicates must be able to be understood from and deduced from the sub­
ject. The individual concept of Alexander the Great must be the foundation 
of all predicates which can be spoken of him. In a later letter to Amauld, Leibniz 
wrote that it is the same also with the concept of Adam. Even the events of 
Adam’s descendents must be contained in the individual concept of Adam.
I hold that the ‘place’ (basboj2, in which individuals in such a sense exist in 
mutual opposition and relation must be an historical space, i.c., the world of 
the absolute present, which is the self-identity of the contradiction between 
the plurality of individuals and the whole. However, in Leibniz, the plurality 
ofindividuals are the ultimately real entities. The individual neither comes 
into being nor passes away; it can only be created or destroyed by God. 
Therefore, the fundamental source of the mutual relation between individuals 
must be sought in God. For this reason Leibniz developed the concept of 
pre-established harmony.
2 Nirbida Kitaro Zembut 2nd ed., vol. XI, pp., 114-36, written in 1944.
Contrary to this thought structure, I think that in philosophy since ancient 
times there has not been a profound consideration of the self-contradiction 
involved in the concept of the individual. Or if it was considered, a new logic 
has not yet been constructed therefrom. An individual is an individual through 
being relative to other individuals. This is a contradiction. However, indi­
viduals are mutually individual only through such contradictory opposition. 
And this, we must say, is possible as a self-identity of contradictions. For 
individuals stand in mutual opposition mediated by absolute negation. As 
long as individuals maintain themselves in their isolated individual selves, 
they cannot be said to be mutually opposed. Consequently, they are not in­
dividuals. A mere isolated individual is nothing at all. As a structure of absolute 
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negation-qua-affirmation, i.e., in the dimension of mutual relation through 
absolute negation, this self-identity of contradictions which is a contradiction- 
qua-identity becomes essential to the concept of the individual. This may be 
termed the self-determination of absolute Nothingness. For the individual to 
be an individual presupposes that the whole is the whole. And the converse 
of this is also true.
As this self-identity of the contradictions between the many and the one, the 
individual is a self-determination of the absolute present in the structure of 
time-qua-space and space-qua-time. God must be the absolute present as the 
self-identity of absolute contradictions. In the world of absolute present, each 
event negates the past and the future, and determines itself as a unique event, 
on the one hand, but is an event which vanishes forever, on the other. This is 
the world of creation, and at the same time the world of coming into being and 
passing away. The notion of pre-established harmony must be, not some sup­
position as in Leibniz, but the logical principle of the structure of the historical 
world.
The mutual relation between independent entities can be neither a mechani­
cal nor teleological structure. The world of the self-identity of contradictions 
in which the many are the many and the whole is the whole must be a world 
which is self-expressive. God as the absolute present can be said to be a self- 
expressive God. Leibniz already touched upon this point (Discourse IX). He 
tells us that the individual is the mirror of God—indeed, is a mirror which ex­
presses the whole world from its own perspective. The concept that each monad 
is a perspective of the world is already involved here. A self-expressive being 
means that the subject and object of expression are one; it is infinitely self- 
expressive in itself.
Now, expression may be conceived only as the connection of mutually 
contradictory beings. For example, as in the relation between two men, ex­
pression has meaning only in the mutual relation between the two individuals. 
In such a relationship, the relation between action and being acted upon, of 
activity and passivity, must be conceived in terms of the relation between form 
and matter. In that structure, both mechanistic and teleological views must 
be abandoned. The being which expresses the other in itself is active (in 
contrast to passive). The being which most clearly expresses the world is the 
most active. Leibniz has already drawn attention to this point (Discourse XU).
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He writes that the essence of a material thing does not lie in the properties of 
extension such as size, shape, and movement, but must be recognized as some­
thing spiritual, which he calles forme iubstaniielle (Aristotle’s entelekia). Having 
pondered the implications of modem physics, he thought to revive the scho­
lastics’ concept of substantial form which had been abandoned.
Therefore, in Leibniz, as in the tradition since Greek philosophy, a being 
with form is an acting being. He philosophizes about the world of power from 
this standpoint of substantial forms. He tells us that just as time is an order of 
continuity, so too space is an order of co-existence. A being in space is a com­
posite being. The spatial world is not the real world; it is the phenomenal world. 
But here, too, Leibniz did not focus attention upon the logical principle of the 
self-identity of contradictions. For form structures matter. The former is con­
sidered as active, the latter as passive. However, even matter must possess 
a nature in some sense. If not, it is nothing at all. Moreover, if it is merely taken 
as form of a lower dimension, a structure between form and matter cannot be 
conceived; there would merely be an order of classification. Matter must be 
the negation of form. Only in the standpoint of affirmation-qua-negation the 
structure between form and matter can be conceived. That form is acting, is 
power, can be conceived. It must mean a transition from the total One to the 
plurality of individuals, and conversely from the plurality of individuals to the 
total One in the relation of the self-identity of the contradiction between the 
many and the One. Precisely this transition from the total One to the plurality 
of individuals is the process of structuring, and is action. This becomes possible 
on the basis that each monad expresses the whole world in itself.
Action involves the fact that an individual as substantial form, by so express­
ing the whole world, forms the world as the self-determination of the whole 
world. However, in order to say that an individual thus functions by expressing 
the whole world in itself, it must conversely be expressed and reflected in such 
a world as an individual which is self-expressive in the form of the self-identity 
of the contradiction between the many and the one. Herein arises the aspect of 
space. An individual as substantial form lies in that as the self-determinations 
of the world, which is a self-identity of contradictions, each individual is the 
world, and at the same time is one center of the whole context. An individual 
substance is both expressed in this world, and expresses itself; it reflects while 
being reflected. Real being is both reflected and reflecting. To be reflected or 
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expressed, means to exist; and there is the transition from expressing, reflect­
ing, to acting. Electrons are also expressible in mathematical form; therefore 
they can be compared with imaginary numbers. From the consideration of the 
world being reflected in individuals themselves in the form of self-negation, 
there is always a world of merely coexisting things, whereas from the idea of 
their reflecting themselves in themselves in the form of self-affirmation, things 
become active beings. This world is a world which both reflects and is reflected. 
The world thus begins from reflecting itself.
The relation between form and matter must be conceived from such a 
perspective. From the perspective of being reflected, everything becomes 
spatial, i.e., material. Contrary to this, from the perspective of reflecting, 
everthing becomes temporal, i.e., form. Leibniz’ concepts of secondary matter 
or secondary power should be defined from the spatial standpoint. Moreover, 
to be reflected is to reflect, and vice versa. The energy of position is the energy 
of movement, and vice versa. Leibniz was already thinking in terms of energies 
in contrast to the Cartesian quantities of motion.
From the above standpoint, I would say that form is self-determining in the 
mode of the self-identity of the contradiction between form and matter. Form 
and matter stand in mutual opposition. Moreover, the transition from form to 
matter in this structure of the self-identity of contradictions is conversely a 
transition from matter to form. That which makes form to be form is the nega­
tion of matter; and the reverse is also true. In the past, philosophers conceived 
of the relation between the two, not from the standpoint of dynamic and 
concrete logic, but merely from the standpoint of abstract logic. What expresses 
is also expressed; the world of absolute reality which is self-expressive must be 
a world in which form is self-determining. Therefore, there is a transition from 
the created to the creating without any underlying substance or ground. The 
laws of nature must be such self-determining forms. God is infinite self-deter­
mining form. Such a form, as something which reflects itself, must be called the 
‘form of the formless? God is absolute Nothingness. Beings of form may be 
called the shadows of the formless. God may be called an eternal mirror, the 
wisdom of a great perfect mirror
Spinoza’s God may perhaps be conceived from such a standpoint. He says 
that matter is a mode which expresses the essence of God in extension 
II, Def. I). In self-determining form, natura natwram equals natura naturata. But 
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Spinoza simply brought Cartesian substance to a logical conclusion in the direc­
tion of the logical subject. He ultimately ended up with an abstract, quiescent 
substance.
Spinoza, going a step further than Descartes’ idea of extension, 
conceived of space in organic terms, and, by regarding the causes 
of motion which individualize matter as the self-determinations of 
space, would include them (the causes of motion) in space. (Letter to 
TtcbirnbauQ.
In terms of my argument above, we may say that the expressive is the 
expressed; the world which, being absolute Nothingness, is self-determining, 
is one in which the reflecting is the reflected; and, as transition from the re­
flected to the reflecting, it is the world in which the eternal future is reflected 
in the eternal past. It is the world in which is contained everything which will 
arise in the eternal eons of the future 6 t O). I call this
‘pre-established harmony.’ In other terms, it is the world of the self-determi­
nation of the absolute present.
That infinite individuals are expressed in the one in the form of self-negation 
is the form of time. It is the form of the moving world, the perpetually perishing 
world. In another respect, that the one expresses an infinite many in itself in 
the form of self-negation is the form of space. It is the form of the world which 
preserves itself, the eternal world. The world of the self-identity of the con­
tradiction between many and one is both spatial as transition from one to many, 
and is temporal as transition from many to one. As self-determination of the 
absolute present, it is transition from the one to the many and from the many 
to the one; it is temporal-spatial and spatio-temporal.
Some men define action as something temporal-spatial, but it must rather be 
spatial-temporal. The temporal-spatial world is the world of subjectivity. The 
physical world is spatial-temporal. In the sense that all appearance is something 
reflected spatially, the existence of things is determined. The world of physical 
matter is abstract in one aspect, but in the spatiality of the absolute present, 
i.e., absolute spatiality, that which arises in the eternity of the future is re­
flected, and there is always opposition between individuals. Leibniz says that 
God had foreknowledge of the fact that Alexander defeated Darius and Polus, 
of whether he would die of sickness or be murdered, of whether Caesar would
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cross the Rubicon. It cannot be said that a non-acting being exists, but neither 
can it be said that nonbeing is active. Things have existence from the fact of the 
world’s being reflected and expressed in absolute space as the self-determination 
of the absolute present which is the self-identity of contradictions. Therein the 
individual may be thought to be eternally indestructible. Thus the transition 
from the reflected to the reflecting is that of the transition from the past to the 
future. Real things are all determined from the eternal past, and move into the 
eternal future. What will arise in the eternity of the future is reflected in ab­
solute space, and included in the absolute present.
The concept of ‘pre-established harmony’ can be articulated from this 
thought structure. That things are acting means that forms are self-determining 
as the self-determinations of such an absolute present. We can also say, with 
Spinoza, that everything is a mode of absolute space. In the world of absolute 
being-qua-absolute Nothingness which is self-expressive and in which the 
expressive is the expressed, the fact of being fbrmatively expressed is the very 
fact of the existence of a thing—the electron exists as something expressed 
mathematically. And action is expressive formation. Acting being is what it is 
by virtue of reflecting the world. Formation, reflection, expression are moments 
of one activity. When there is objectively the expressive and formative, it is 
subjectively said to be reflecting, and, in its ultimate point, action-intuition.3 
All beings which exist as individual substance in the world of the absolute 
present, the historical world, must be something expressed in God, something 
whose name is recorded before God. All beings which come historically into 
being as the self-determinations of the absolute present must be foreknown in 
God. The principle of identity that there are no two identical substances, and 
the principle of sufficient reason that nothing happens without a reason, must 
be one in essence with the concept of pre-established harmony.
From my perspective, Spinoza’s ‘substance’ can be understood as absolute 
space. Self-determining forms of substance as natura naturans and determined 
forms as natura naturata are “modes”. But since Spinoza’s philosophy is one 
which absolutely negates the individual, and is nontemporal, its form is mathe­
matical. Spinoza’s active intuition was mathematical; even ethics became 
geometrical.
3
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The world which expresses and reflects itself in itself in the form of the micro- 
cosmic-qua-macrocosmic—in the sense that the individual both expresses the 
whole world and is one contextual oenter of the whole world—possesses order 
in itself, i.e., is a world of law. I call it a creative system; or to speak in logical 
terms, a world of the self-determination of the creative universal. But in what 
sense does it possess order and is it a world of law?
Leibniz has said that the expression of the world in which individuals, which 
belong to God in the form of pre-established harmony, each expressing the 
world from its own perspective, need not be one of complete identity, for if it 
is proportional, it is sufficient (Ditcourse, XIV). The individual is unique. It must 
be a world which is self-determining. If not, it is not individual. However, at 
the same time, it is individual relative to other individuals. It is individual 
through expressing the whole world. The more that it is individual, the 
more that it must be a unique self-expression of the world, and the more 
it must be a temporally-singular event. In that structure, I speak of self- 
determining events. The forms of the world of the mutual determination 
between the many, i.e., between individuals each of which is individual and 
unique in this way, cannot be called identical in the sense of being a mere self­
identity. They may perhaps be said to be proportionelk> as Leibniz says. For 
that relations expressed from entirely different perspectives are identical would 
seem to mean that they are mutually proportionelk. Thus each world expresses 
itself in the form of a functional number. Self-determining form, self-reflecting 
form, may be said to be a functional number in this sense. In mathematical 
terms, in the self-expressive world from the perspective of what is expressed, 
i.e., from the perspective of the self-determination of the many, individual and 
individual respectively correspond in the mode of simple (cardinal) numbers. 
From the contrary standpoint of reflecting, the perspective of the self-deter­
mination of the total one, everything is mutually expressive i.e., is a functional 
number. The symbolic forms of the world which is self-determining in the mode 
of the self-identity of contradiction may thus be called mathematical.
However, when, as a creative system, each individual becomes a creative 
function in the form of negation of past and future, the world becomes a world 
in the “historical-bodily mode” 69^18 69), in the sense of a transition 
from the created to the creating. Forms which are self-determining in such a 
mode must be considered to be the ‘laws’ of the historical world. They are the 
28
TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
forms of the world in which each present is self-determining as self-determina­
tion of the absolute present. The laws of physical matter are also nothing other 
than this. The laws of the conversion of energy in the form of the transition 
from the energy of position to the energy of motion, and vice versa, can be 
considered as forms of the self-determination of the self-reflecting world. The 
world ofSpinozan substance which truly exists and is understood in itself must 
thus be a self-reflecting world without underlying substratum or ground, a 
world of functional numbers. To conceive of either the total one or the plural 
many as substance or logical subject would be to substantialize concepts. In 
such terms, there can be no thoroughgoing empiricism.
Leibniz says that even though every substance or monad expresses 
the same phenomenon, their expression of it is not necessarily the 
same, and may be called proportional to one another. Said oonversely, 
when one thing expresses itself in a different way, its expression may 
be said to be proportional to the expression of another thing. For 
example, ‘I am growing old’ and ‘I am doting’ are proportional. Such a 
proportion presupposes at its ground, something self-expressive in 
different ways of expression i.e., something self-conscious. What is 
self-conscious involves self-expression in the sense that the expressive 
and expressed are one. It becomes the functional number of itself. 
Relations of functional numbers are established from such a stand­
point. If we take ‘I am growing old. as x and ‘I am doting’ as 7, we can 
say in terms of self-consciousness that ^==/(x). The self-expressive 
world, which exists and moves by itself, is a self-identity in the sense 
of being its own system of functional numbers in such a sense. To 
conceive of some substance or ground at its bottom would merely be 
a metaphysical dogmatism. The world which begins from self­
reflection without any underlyihg substance or ground is one which 
becomes its own functional numbers (a self-identity of self-conscious­
ness, i.e., its own system of functional numbers). What I have spoken 
of as a thoroughgoing empiricism arises in such a perspective. Even 
the physical laws exist in the form of functional numbers from such 
a standpoint. At their ground, there must be the self-consciousness of 
action-intuition of our ‘selP as the concrete self. This is a physical 
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experiment. In mathematics, there is also the action-intuition of 
mathematics.
I think that a synthesis or mutual relation of various dimensions 
may be defined from such a standpoint of the self-consciousness of 
action-intuition. Dimensions can be considered as various ways or 
directions of expression of something self-expressive. Also in regard to 
continuity in the very broad sense, I think that even though the direc­
tions, i.e., dimensions, differ, whatever is one self-expressively i.e., 
self-consciously, would be continuous. A straight line is, as it were, 
something self-conscious in one direction i.e., merely temporally. 
Can’t we think of geometry from this point of view? Geometrical 
space is merely self-determining form in abstraction from time. We can 
even think of it as the aspect of the self-consciousness of active intui­
tion which is purely spatial.
Cannot Riemann’s concept of space be viewed as space in the sense 
that every point is the self-determination of the absolute present 
which is self-conscious? But I should like to defer such considerations 
to another day (cf. my later article, ‘Space.’)
If we think in the above terms, we may be able to say, with Leibniz, that in 
one aspect God has created the best of all possible worlds in terms of pre-es­
tablished harmony. The self-expressive world which reflects itself in itself as 
the self-identity of the contradiction between the many and the one is one in 
which the eternal future is reflected in the eternal past. It is the world in which 
the present is self-determining as the self-determination of the absolute present. 
In such a world, everything that arises into being, whatever it may be, arises 
as a unique event throughout past and future. Thus we can say that God, 
having conceived of all possible worlds, has created this actual world as the best 
world. As the self-determination of the absolute present, this actual world 
is the world of the compomblei. Every individual thing must be a possible world. 
The world which exists as one as the self-negation of infinite individuals must 
be the world of the compostibla. Conversely, it can be said that this world is a 
world structured through synthesis from an infinite perspective—indeed, from 
the standpoint of a perspective of perspectives.
This kind of metaphysical view seems not to be conceivable from the stand­
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point of abstract logic. From the standpoint of abstract logic, such a thing as 
a world of compossibles has no meaning. Contingent truth does not arise from 
eternal truth. Abstract logic only goes from the universal to the particular—a 
form of logic in which one world determines itself within itself. Contingent 
truth must derive from the standpoint of the self-consciousness of the practical 
self which is one of action-intuition. It must derive from the standpoint of what 
I call the logic of basbo, which takes the law of sufficient reason as its funda­
mental principle. Abstract logic which follows the law of identity, the logic 
of the intellectual facts of the self, is included by it as one of its moments. The 
axiomatic mathematicians attempt to define even numbers from the standpoint 
of abstract logic, but I take the contrary position that mathematics is to be 
defined as a form of contingent truth.
The principles of inference must not follow the law of identity but the law 
of sufficient reason. Our recognition of a temporally singular and unique event 
takes place in the standpoint of the self-awareness of the self in the mode of 
action-intuition. As a creative point i.e., a self-determining point of historical 
space as a self-determining aspect of the absolute present, our ‘self can re­
cognize temporally singular and unique events. In historical space, every point 
becomes the beginning of the world. An event is self-determining by virtue of 
negating eternal past and future, and at the same time exists by virtue of taking 
the self-negation of eternity as its condition. A unique event should be re­
cognized to have such a structure. The world of contingent facts arises on the 
basis of such a structure. In other terms, it is the world which arises by the form 
of the compossibles. All scientific knowledge is grounded on it. The world of 
the self-determination of the absolute present is a transition from the created 
to the creating, a world of self-consciousness of the self as action-intuition. And 
the converse is also true.
Such a world, as the world in which the eternal future is reflected in the eternal 
past, is a world whose existence is grounded upon the logical form of the com­
possibles, i.e., of the logic of basbo. In this way of looking at things, everything 
that arises into being may be said to be in a structure of pre-established har­
mony, and of the law of sufficient reason. The more it is of the absolute present, 
the more we can speak in these terms. The principle of the smallest function 
which is considered the highest principle of physics arises therefrom. If the 
principle of the smallest function is understood subjectively or teleologically,
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it cannot be said to be a scientific principle. However, conceived in the above 
terms, it must be the fundamental form of all causal law. What is conceived 
as objectivity for us arises in terms of the principle of the smallest function as 
the self-determination of the absolute present in which the future is reflected 
in the past. Even social phenomena arise as the self-determinations of the ab­
solute present by subjectivity reflecting itself in the form of the environment. 
The physical world is a world in the past tense in that it is the self-determina­
tion of the spatiality of the absolute present, the self-determination of absolute 
space. It is the negation of the future, and deterministic. However, this does 
not mean a merely mechanistic world. Similar to the causality of the historical 
world, there must be pre-established harmony at its ground. The form of the 
logic of the compossibles is the form of scientific logic. Thus it must include 
action-intuition as the logical form of the self-consciousness of the self as paiaii.
The laws of the world, in which forms are self-determining as the 
self-determinations of the absolute present and in which the future is 
reflected in the past, cannot help being probable. They do not have 
their ground in the form of a total one, they also do not have their 
ground in the plurality of individuals. Laws are neither teleological 
nor mechanistic. It is not that as in classical physics, probability be­
longs to an observing subject, but that subjectivity is included by 
objectivity. Laws are not necessary; but saying this does not mean 
that there are no laws. Beings that arise into being exist by being 
expressed in the absolute present. They arise as the self-determinations 
of the absolute present, as transitions from the expressed to the ex­
pressing. Forms are self-determining. We see such self-determining 
forms, i.e., the laws of nature, by functioning as historical bodies, i.e., 
through scientific experiment. Thus, the more we are individual, 
thinking, and analytic, the more we see universal laws as expressive 
of the self-determination of the world of the absolute present which 
embraces past and future.
In the world of the absolute present, as I have maintained above, the eternal 
future is reflected in the eternal past. In such a perspective, the world is a pre- 
established harmony. In the ultimate of the standpoint of the self-determining 
present, the world may even be considered deterministic. The world may be 
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defined as physical in such a point of view. However, in the world of the ab­
solute present the transition from past to future is conversely the transition 
from future to past. Were light rays of seven colors within a colorless ray of 
light? They existed. But they did so in the sense of appearing through the 
refraction of a prism. The reflected derives from the reflecting. Past is made 
from future. In such a standpoint, the world is always from the future. The 
world is teleological—indeed, the world is one of freedom. In the world of the 
self-identity of absolute contradictions, both past and future are infinite. Indeed, 
there is no point of departure in the past; there is no point of destination in the 
future. There is not even one unique direction. It is thus completely the situa­
tion of‘having no place wherein it abides, this Mind arises’4 (the PwwwWSwrra), 
and of‘thoughts suddenly arise’5 (the Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana'). It is 
a world of the freedom of necessity and the necessity of freedom. Therefore, it 
is the world of the infinite ought, the world of morality. Being reflected in the 
eternal past, each individual has its own existence; at the same time, each 
individual is a free will as a being which is self-determining, and creates the 
eternal future.
Such necessity is not physical necessity, but moral necessity. Leibniz has 
already made this distinction. Here the sufficient reason must be Kant’s ‘you 
should act in such a way!’ The world of the Leibnizian monad must ultimately 
be a world of co-existence in which unlimited persons face one another by tak­
ing God as center. Such an idea already reminds us of Kant’s concept of the 
‘Realm of ends’. But in Leibniz, who had not escaped the standpoint of the 
logic of the Aristotelian subject of predication, the relation between the totality 
and individuals was not truly a self-identity of contradictions. The total one 
was always fundamental. In Christian terms, God was the absolute subject. 
Therefore, the world could not help being the best of all possible worlds as the 
creation of God who lacked no perfection. However, such a God is not the 
absolute God (not even die Gottbeit). As the perfect relative to the imperfect, the 
good relative to evil, such a God does not avoid being a relative God. Leibniz’ 
God was merely the highest substance conceived in terms of the subject of 
predication, and could not include all predicates. True free will cannot appear 
4 A
5
c 33
THE EASTERN BUDDHIST
from such a perspective. In it, there is no room for the concept of the true in­
dividual, the true individual person. Consequently, there is no true evil; evil 
is merely imperfection. It rather cannot avoid the coloration of being a pan­
theistic teaching which Christianity rejects most severely.
Contrary to this perspective, the world of the self-determination of the 
absolute present must include absolute negation, must include ultimate evil. 
The world of the absolute present neither has a point from which it arises 
in the past nor a point of conclusion in the future. It has neither beginning nor 
end. It is always the self-determination of the present. In medieval mystical 
philosophy, God was conceived as an infinite sphere Qpbaera infinitaj) in which, 
because there is no circumference, the center is everywhere. It is conversely the 
world of opposition between unlimited individuals, i.e., of opposition between 
wills, a world of infinite struggle (Boehme’s centro naturae is in this category). 
It must be Shinran’s world of‘fiery passions and grave sins’ 0 M
^3f). The world begins from the fact of the self itself being reflected. ‘Thoughts 
suddenly arise, their name is ignorance’ The world
begins from evil. Our existence consists in evil. In Christianity as well, man has 
original sin. In such a direction, the world is corrupt, is eternal death. However, 
the world also begins from the fact of reflecting itself. It may be called the crea­
tion of God as the determination of indetermination, as transition from nothing­
ness to being. We are created as creative elements of the creative world, creata 
et cream. Therein, as servants of God, we have eternal life.
Man is also physical as transition from past to future. Man is impulsive and 
animal as transition from the reflected to the reflecting. Man is desiring and 
selfish as self-determination of the absolute present, as reflecting while being 
reflected. Men are always volitional and rebellious as unique individuals. But 
men are divinely moral as creating while being created. Moreover, it is not that 
man is divine because he is moral; but because he is divine, he is moral. As long 
as one’s morality is conceived from the self as something reflected, it does not 
avoid being selfish in terms of self-power. This is not the truly moral. The same 
is true even of the rational (as well as the moral).
As said above, I think that I can conceive of the Christian God as creator in 
the standpoint of the self-determination of the absolute present. The relation 
between creator and creatures can truly be grasped as the self-determination 
of the world as self-identity of absolute contradictions. The relation between
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God and man is a self-identity of absolute contradictions. There is absolutely 
no road from man to God. Nevertheless, the more that we become individual, 
the more we approach God: It is just as,
‘Buddha and I, separate through a billion kalpas, yet not separate 
for an instant; encountering each other the whole day through, yet 
not encountering each other for an instant.6
6 DaitS Kokushi
The true God is not the usual idea of God, but rather die Gottbeit such as spoken 
of by the mystics in the West. The true God is the ‘Emptiness’ of the PrajOd- 
pdramita-iutra. Christianity calls this pantheistic. But even if we conceive of 
a God as subject at the ground of the world, it on the contrary does not avoid 
being pantheistic. This can be said even of Leibniz. Contrary to this, may we 
think of God as absolutely transcendent, by negating such relations? This 
would merely produce a God of negation, a distant God, which would on the 
contrary not avoid being relative. A Deus absconditus cannot be said to be the 
absolute God.
I think there is such a weak point in present-day dialectical theology. The 
truly absolute God must both transcend and embrace us. But such a fact cannot 
be conceived from the standpoint of the logic of the Aristotelian subject of 
predication in the West. My concept of the self-determination of the absolute 
present cannot be understood in pantheistic terms. To do so would be to under­
stand my thought in terms of objective logic. The standpoint of my logic makes 
the individual to be the individual. Each individual is a unique personal stand­
point. Therefore, the individual is a perspective in relation to the person of 
the unique God as the total One—is a perspective which arises in the relation 
between creator and creature.
In the standpoint of the absolute present time is negated. However, this 
standpoint only negates abstract time, it rather is the standpoint of concrete 
time which truly makes time to be such. There is that which truly makes time 
to be such in the dimension which is the self-determination of the absolute 
present which is a spatial structure as the One as the self-negation of the many. 
It is neither the perspective which merely transcends time in Platonic fashion, 
35
THE EASTERN BUDDHIST
nor the perspective which negates history. Rather, it is the perspective which 
truly makes history to be such.
An Eastern concept of motion must arise herefrom—that is, motion as the 
oneness of motion and rest. This is not a view of resignation, as persons may 
think, but must stand in the perspective of confrontation with the absolute at 
every moment. We exist in an eschatological perspective at every moment as 
the momentary self-determinations of the absolute present. In the standpoint 
of the self-determining present, each moment is the beginning and end of the 
world. Said even in the terms of the historians, in the historical world every 
point becomes the beginning (cf. Ranke).
Present-day Buddhists have forgotten such a true meaning of the Mahayana 
(Great Vehicle). Eastern culture must arise again from such a standpoint. It 
must contribute a new light to world culture. As the self-determination of the 
absolute present, the national polity Qkokuta'i) of Japan is a norm of historical 
action in such a perspective. The above mentioned true spirit of the Mahayana 
is in the East preserved today only in Japan.
II
In the world of the absolute present, in the standpoint in which the eternal 
future is reflected in the eternal past, everything has the form of pre-established 
harmony, and is a thing of destiny. However, all existence has existed in the 
sense of appearing. From the eternal past means from the eternal future. The 
world is an infinitely free world; it is the world of the will, of effort. As individu­
als of such a world our selves act by reflecting the world. Our selves are intellec­
tual in this dimension of reflecting the world and are volitional in the dimen­
sion of forming the world.
The world thus begins in the dimension that the present determines itself 
as the self-determination of the absolute present. The self begins in the dimen­
sion that knowledge and will unite, in the sense that that which reflects and 
that which is reflected are one. The self arises in the place that the world arises; 
the world arises in the place that the self arises. Therefore, our self-consciousness 
is the self-expression of the world, and the self-expression of the world is our 
self-consciousness. Our eternal life is to be sought herein. To turn one’s back 
on God is to die, and to return to God is to enter into eternal life. Religion must 
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be an exigency of such eternal life, i.e., it must be the exigency of man’s true 
self-awareness. Therefore, Augustine states: ‘Thou hast created us facing Thee, 
O Lord, and our hearts will never rest until they rest in Thee.’ I am opposed 
not only to the attempt to discuss religion in merely intellectual terms or in 
the terms of objective logic, but also to the consideration of religion through 
the mediation of moral demands, for both knowledge and the will derive from 
the self-awareness of the self. The self is intellectual and volitional as an in­
dividual of the world of the self-determining present.
I have stated above that the self begins in the dimension that knowledge and 
the will are one, but actually the self is intellectual and volitional as a self­
contradictory existence. Both learning and morality derive therefrom. Both 
learning and morality derive from self-contradiction, and both are based on 
the self-identity of contradiction. When we focus upon such a self-identity of 
contradictions in the very depths of the self-awareness of the self, we become 
religious. Therefore, to enter into the religious dimension one must encounter 
absolute contradiction along some road of life. However, once we have pene­
trated to the true self, it has been the call of God. From that ground both learn­
ing and morality become religious—indeed, ‘wearing clothes and eating rice,’ 
there is nothing that is not religious. Religion is the problem of the self.
Our self can be reduced to neither intellect nor will. Because there is a self, 
there is knowledge; and because there is the self, there is the will. What, then, 
is the self? It is something which is both created and creating, something which 
is in the mode of “historical-bodily.” It is neither mere matter nor mere spirit. 
Form is self-determining in the dimension that the present is self-determining 
as the self-determination of the absolute present. Form is the shadow of the 
formless. The world is creative, “historical-bodily”. The world is filled with 
life. Our selves are creative points of such a world. Leibniz called the monad a 
metaphysical point, but I conceive of each individual self as a creative point of 
the historical world. It extends to the eternal future and to the eternal past as 
the point of self-determination of the absolute present. The self is intellectual 
in the dimension of reflecting the eternal past; it is volitional in the dimension 
of reflecting the eternal future. It is a being which is self-aware and which has 
self-love in the dimension of reflecting itself in the sense that that which is 
reflecting is that which is reflected. The will thus arises from self-love.
Therefore our selves are beings of action-intuition as points of the self­
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expression of the self-expressive world. To see with the body is to act, and 
conversely acting is seeing. Self-awareness involves action-intuition in some 
sense. There is no self-awareness when there is no action-intuition. Therefore 
rather than saying that the self-awareness of the self arises from within, I think 
that it rather arises from without. Our self-awareness exists in the dimension 
of immanence-qua-transcendence, and of transcendence-qua-immanence. In 
terms of psychology as well, the self-awareness of a child develops from facing 
persons in its surroundings. Persons who conceive of the concrete from the 
abstract derive self-awareness from knowledge or the will. But as I have stated 
above, exactly the converse is true. Or it may perhaps be thought in a develop­
mental sense to arise from unconsciousness, but consciousness does not arise 
from mere unconsciousness; being does not arise from non-being.
It may then perhaps be said that self-consciousness is a process from the 
potential to the actual. But usually such a process merely means that something 
which had not yet appeared appears temporally, and the matter is understood 
in terms of objective logic. But to consider our self-consciousness to be such a 
process of emergence from the potential to the actual through such a thought­
structure would be a mistake. It is not that our self-awareness can merely be 
conceived as a temporal process. For it begins from the present determining 
itself as the self-determination of the absolute present. Temporal process rather 
arises as self-determination in terms of basbo. The end exists in the beginning. 
Of course, perhaps the same may also be said in the structure of emergence from 
the potential to the actual, i.e., in a so-called teleological structure. However, 
the form of self-consciousness is such a form itself of the self-determination of 
the present. It is a spatial structure, so to speak. Therefore it may be said to 
reflect itself within itself. It is not something linear such as a teleological process, 
but is circular. The totality appears and acts from the beginning; it is not merely 
an unconsciousness.
Every process of consciousness arises according to the form of self-awareness. 
The essence of such self-awareness has not yet been fully investigated. Speaking 
in general terms, it may perhaps also be termed process of emergence from the 
potential to the actual, but it differs in its structure from a process of teleological 
development. It is a spatial process, as it were, in contrast to being a temporal 
process—indeed, it is a non-processive process. In the standpoint of knowledge 
we are unending processes of cognizing the objective world. In action we are 
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unending processes which form the objective world. But in the standpoint of 
self-awareness, there is neither something to know nor something to do in such 
a sense. Such a thing as one’s personal character already belongs to the ex­
ternal; it is an historical fact. When we are conscious, the self already exists, 
and already functions. When we speak about a process, we are only clarifying 
this point. Therefore it is not that something different appears: for ‘upon 
returning there is no different thing?7 However, this does not mean to enter 
within subjectively as is usually thought. Rather, it is to proceed outwards; 
it is to negate the self. Indeed, it means that interior becomes exterior and vice- 
versa. The very opposition between interior and exterior appears as the self- 
determination of the absolute present.
In self-awareness we do not merely enter within the self; for we return to the 
fundamental source of the self. This must be to enter into the fundamental 
source of the existence of the world. When the self begins, the world begins, and 
when the world begins, the self begins. The dimension of religion is this di­
mension of self-awareness. Therein arises the unique dimension of religion itself 
which differs from those of knowledge and morality.
Religion neither conceives God from the standpoint of knowledge as an 
ultimate principle nor asserts the existence of God as a postulate from the stand­
point of morality. Again, even so, it is not based upon mere subjective mystical 
experience, either. As I have stated above, it is the standpoint as the foundation 
of knowledge and morality: it is the standpoint of self-awareness. No man 
would conceive the consciousness of self-awareness as something mystical. 
Nevertheless, this is a consciousness which differs in dimension from the 
consciousness of objective cognition or the consciousness of moral duty, for it is 
consciousness of the very existence of the self, and thus differs in direction from 
the other two. The content of such consciousness, or of such knowledge may not 
perhaps be called knowledge. But this depends on one’s way of defining knowl­
edge. Even such a thing as the Kantian a priori must rather today be understood 
as something which has the meaning of active self-awareness.
The discipline of philosophy also arises in the standpoint of the consciousness 
of our self-awareness. In previous philosophy, the uniqueness i.e., the funda­
mental nature of the consciousness of our self-awareness, was not deeply 
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pondered. Hence its own form was not clarified. Self-consciousness is that in 
which knower is the known, thinker is the thought. Speaking more broadly, it 
is the undifferentiation of subject and object of expression. It may perhaps be 
said that this is an impossibility or a self-con tradition; but precisely because 
it is a self-identity of contradiction is it self-consciousness. It is not that it arises 
from the cogito of the self in a psychological way as expressed in Descartes. 
Rather, to express it in logical terms, as in the Prajnaparamita-iutra, it may be 
said that ‘because all minds are not mind, therefore they are called mind.’ It 
may seem to be a paradox but the discrimination of non-discrimination is true 
self-awareness, (cf. Daisetsu Suzuki).
In Western philosophy, Nicholas of Cusa’s idea ofcdocta ignorantia (learned 
ignorance) is closest to this idea. Led on the one hand by negative theology, he 
desired at the same time to give it a logical structure. Thus Cusa may be said 
to be the precursor of Leibniz. He says that all investigation is already compara­
tive based on analogy with things known. (comparativa est omnis inqtiisitto). 
Therefore Cusanus was mathematical. The maximum destroys comparison and 
opposition; it must be something than which there is no greater. Such a highest 
perfection must be one. Such a one which transcends comparison and opposition 
with all others is all things; it is something which exists in all things, and coin­
cides with the infinitesimal. This is God. He states that the maximum fuses 
with the infinitesimal. (In Cusanus we are already reminded of the theory of 
infinity in modem mathematics.) He states that mathematics is the best help 
and guide to know the truth of God. He uses the example of an infinite sphere 
to express God. As the foundation of all things, God, who in terms of affirmative 
theology may be called the maximum of being is precisely God who in negative 
theology cannot be named. God is absolute being and at the same time absolute 
nothingness.
Cusanus’ philosophy of the <coincidentia oppositorum’ would seem to be best 
expressed by the logic of baibo. But Cusanus’ thought was still subjective due 
to Christian influence. For even though he speaks of negation, he still did not 
avoid the standpoint of the logic of the Aristotelian logical subject. He did not 
have the idea of true absolute negation-qua-affirmation. In true absolute nega­
tion there is nothing which can be negated. Consequently, his philosophy did 
not avoid a mystical coloration. His logic was not a logic of true actuality. A 
logic of true ‘learned ignorance’ must be a logic of self-awareness. The source 
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of our knowledge and action is included therein. Our self knows itself and is 
self-aware in the place that the world is self-determining as self-identity of 
contradiction and as the self-determination of the absolute present Conversely, 
the world is self-determining in the place that our self is self-aware. A logic of 
self-awareness is thus a logic of the formation of the world, and conversely a 
logic of the formation of the world is a logic of self-awareness.
Persons who think from the standpoint of objective logic may perhaps call 
this pantheistic, but exactly the opposite is true. That the individual is in­
dividual means precisely that the whole is the whole; that the whole is the 
whole means precisely that the individual is the individual. If not, there is no 
logic of self-awareness. The more deeply we reflect upon the source of the self 
in the deep inferiority of the self, the more that we face the absolute God out­
side. The relation between God and man is that of a unity in the structure of 
the self-identity of contradiction. This is not something mystical. From the 
standpoint of such self-awareness our selves are infinite processes of the self­
identity of contradiction in intellectual and active terms.
The logic of self-consciousness is an axiom of our historical life. The axioms 
of science also derive from it. As formative elements of the historical world 
our selves always function as self-identities of contradiction. We function in 
terms of the logic of self-awareness; the self is such a process of transition 
from the created to the creating. We always think that the self forms the 
world by reflecting the world. As long as our selves are individual we must 
think in such a way. The individual self is one of self-power. Therein lies a 
deep contradiction, anxiety and anguish, in the existence of the self itself. 
This contradiction cannot be eliminated by the power of the self. For it is our 
very existence, it is the very essence of our life. It is impossible to eliminate it 
even through moral efforts. For moral action is a process grounded on such a 
self-identity of contradiction. The root of man’s religious exigency is to be 
sought herein.
That our selves as individuals reflect the world means in turn that we 
become focal points of the world which is a self-identity of contradictions. 
Such a self-identity of contradictions is always realized at the basis of our 
self-awareness. Our self-awareness is established thereon. The deeper that 
our self-awareness becomes, the more we encounter such a self-identity of 
contradictions. Hence ‘our hearts will never rest, Oh Lord, until they rest in 
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Thee.’ And this is conversely the call of God. Here there must be a conversion 
of life, or what is called religious conversion of mind. Whether called faith, 
or enlightenment, it must involve a fundamental conversion of life as the 
self-determination of the self-identity of absolute contradictions.
Although I speak of faith, I do not mean a kind of subjective belief, as some 
may think. In his preface to the Epistle to the Romans, Luther states that faith is 
not a fantasy or a vain imagination of man, as people sometimes take faith to 
be. Rather, faith is the working of God within us; we are made newly to live 
by God; killing the old Adam, faith makes us become entirely other men and 
is accompanied by the Holy Spirit. Enlightenment or intuition also does not 
mean to cognize something objectively. Dogen says, ‘To learn the way of the 
Buddha is to learn the self. To learn the self is to forget the self. To forget the 
self is to be enlightened by all dharmas. To be enlightened by all dharmas is 
to cause one’s own body and mind and other bodies and minds to drop ofT.’ 
This must mean the determination of non-determination, the self-determina­
tion of absolute Nothingness. He also says, ‘it is by all dharmas’ advancing 
that one enlightens the self.’8 Our true self-awareness arises herefrom. Dogen 
tells us that the attempt to enlighten all dharmas by bringing forward or ad­
vancing the self is an illusion.
The world of the self-identity of the absolute present in which the present 
is self-determining as self-identity of contradiction is therefore religious in the 
very ground of its existence. That the world arises from its self-reflection means 
that it exists religiously. In such a world the plurality of individuals and the 
One stand opposed in the structure of the self-identity of contradictions. God 
and man face each other as opposite poles. The more that our selves are person­
ally individual the more that we face the absolute and unique God. Such a 
world is historical as transition from the created to the creating. The historical 
world is a structure of immanence-qua-transcendence and transcendence-qua- 
immanence; the religious dimension must be the very ground of its existence. 
Therefore we may think that there is mythos at the foundation of history. If 
not, history would be reducible to nature.
In the above standpoint, I attempt to articulate a philosophy of religion. 
The various questions of philosophy of religion must be considered from such
42
TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
a standpoint. Various religions arise through the forms of the self-identity of 
contradiction between God and Man.
Now, each religion must be different from every other in its determined form. 
Christianity is historical. It considers this world to be the creation of God. It 
teaches that we are creatures of God. God creates man after His own image. 
Therein man is personal and free. God and man always face one another as 
opposite poles. The history of man begins from the original sin of Adam. Man 
who is the descendant of Adam is a sinner who should be thrown into the fires 
of Hell. However, he is saved only through belief in Christ who is man as the 
son of God who died and rose again for our sake. It thus teaches that we are 
justified through faith. This world is the world of the providence of God, an 
eschatological world.
Buddhism, on the contrary, may be considered to be non-historical. Where 
the objective world does not become the background, however, there is neither 
anguish and suffering, nor sin and evil, nor deliverance. For in that context no 
religion can arise. I have once said in comparing Eastern and Western cultures 
that Christianity is spatial and Buddhism is temporal. The world of the ab­
solute present is always a structure which is both temporal-spatial, and spatial- 
temporal. Christianity sees this world as something spatial-temporal, as 
objective-formative. Buddhism, on the contrary, sees it as a world of birth-and- 
death, as something temporal-spatial.
In Christianity, this world is the world of the creation of God, whereas in 
Buddhism this world is always a transition from the created to the creating, 
a world of historical necessity, of karma. It is a world of infinite coming into 
being and passing away, a world of mere sorrow. There is absolutely no escape.
In Pure Land Buddhism, we are saved only by the oompassion of Buddha. 
The world of eternal sorrow is in one aspect the world of the vow of the Buddha. 
It is thought that by believing in the Buddha and adhering to him we shall 
be bom in the Pure Land. Both Christianity and Pure Land Buddhism have 
something in common in one aspect as religions of absolute dependence, but 
in another respect they are contrary perspectives. From this historical world 
which is transcendence-qua-immanence and immanenoe-qua-transcendence, 
it may be said that the former transcends this world in the direction of tran­
scendence, and in the direction of objectivity, whereas the latter transcends this 
world in the direction of immanence, and in the direction of subjectivity. In 
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either case the essence of religion consists in penetration to the true source of 
our self as self-determination of the absolute present. Therefore, conversion 
of mind involves a kind of‘seeing? Of course, though I say ‘seeing? I do not 
mean that we see anything objectively, for it is a kind of seeing of non-seeing. 
While Zen developed from Buddhism, its essence consists in this kind of seeing. 
Therefore, its ‘seeing’ is something that functions even in learning and art. 
Even enlightenment would seem only to mean to penetrate to the fundamental 
source of self-awareness. It is not anything mystical at all.
As is well known Descartes understood the intuition of self-consciousness as 
the form of truth. In the Cartesian school, knowing is thought of, to the same 
extent, as acting. Leibniz too conceived that which expresses the world clearly 
as something acting, whereas in Spinoza knowing was power. When we are the 
adequate cause for some matter, we are acting, (Spinoza, Ethics, Definition I, 
Prop. 3). This is nothing other than saying that the matter is to be understood 
clearly and distinctly from our very nature. Man is a completely intellectual 
being; homo co git at. Various emotions exist as long as there exist the ideas of 
things which become objects. That he states that an effect follows from a cause 
is also mathematical. In Spinoza there is no time. However, our selves are intel­
lectual by virtue of expressing the world as individuals of the world which is a 
self-identity of contradictions. That the individual expresses the world means 
in turn self-expressions of the world and thereby we are beings of action-intui­
tion. Our selves are intellectual from the fact of form being self-determining. 
Man must be creata et creans. The cogitans derives therefrom.
Religious intuition is not so-called intellectual intuition; it involves the fact 
that the volitional self as a unique individual intuits its very self as a self- 
determination of the absolute present. In such a sense, it is true self-awareness. 
Our selves are unique individuals extending from the eternal past to the eternal 
future as self-determinations of the absolute present. The self is volitional in 
a sense that the reflected is the reflecting. The self is such as self-determination 
at the momentary instant of the absolute present. In such a sense, I follow 
Spinoza. Therefore, persons who attain religious faith in such a sense, who 
become self-aware religiously, may be said to illustrate the dictum that ‘he is 
master of himself wherever he goes’9 as self-determinations of the absolute 
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present. Such persons are always active. Moreover, this knowledge may be 
called ‘learned ignorance,’ or discrimination of non-discrimination. I do not 
mean that the man of religious self-awareness is the scientific savant or the 
man of practical powers. Here there is neither male nor female, neither sage 
nor fool. “As he stands all is right with him.”10 From the depths of such ‘non­
ego,’ infinite compassion wells forth. Love is something objective. Hence in 
this instance, I should rather like to use the word Compassion.
It would be a great mistake if people should hold that religion is merely 
a matter of individual peace of mind, and therefore is unrelated to the question 
of nation. The world of the absolute present is always historical and formative 
as the self-determination of form. This must be called national. Nations are 
the forms of the self-formation of the historical world. National polities 
(TwkutaT) are such forms of individuality. Our selves must be national in 
the sense of always being historical and formative as individuals of the world 
of the absolute present. True obedience to the nation should be derived from 
the standpoint of true religious self-awareness. Mere seeking one’s own peaoe 
of mind is selfish. This is a perspective diametrically opposed to religious self­
awareness.
The historical world is a world in which forms are self-determining in a 
temporal-spatial, spatial-temporal structure. The world is creative through 
self-formation; it is infinitely processive, and temporal. As creative elements 
of the creative world, our selves touch the infinite self-expression of the world. 
The world is moral in this dimension. Nations must be the forms of the self- 
expressive world in such a sense. Therefore they may be conceived as the source 
of morality. However, the temporal world is conversely the spatial world. The 
historical world is a transition from one historical age to another; it is spatially 
self-determining. Herein forms intuit themselves, are the Ideas, in the sense 
that the temporal is the spatial and motion is rest. In such a standpoint, the 
world is always a structure of cultures. But such a world itself as self-determina­
tion of the absolute present, is one in which in its foundation each individual 
self reflects the world of the absolute present and at the same time is a self- 
determination of the world of the absolute present. Our selves must be the 
self-determinations at the momentary instants of the world in which the present 
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is self-determining. Herein the world is religious. The world begins from 
self-reflection of itself. Both morality and culture are grounded on the religious.
translated by David A. Dilworth
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